Nuclear postures of India and China reflect a quiet sense of nuclear stability, a feature missing in other adversarial nuclear dyads among the nine nuclear-armed States. At this status, units must move to firing positions (or at least prepare to move), many of which may be tunnels or prepared underground, protected positions. Mutual strategic restraint includes mutual deterrence but places more importance on dialogue and reaching agreements between the two sides that will help avoid misjudgment and reduce fear, hostility, and mistrust.56 Chinese-U.S. nuclear relations must be established on the foundation of this new type of strategic stability, which prioritizes positive interaction and crisis management. In the early 1960's, this campaign was expanded to include heavy industries. Sun Xiangli, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies at Beijing’s Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, argues that China’s nuclear strategy is basically characterized by a no-first-use policy, a limited but effective nuclear force, and support for nuclear disarmament.1, The second school of thought is the minimum nuclear deterrence doctrine. attack on Chinese cities and industrial facilities, particularly in China was the first state to pledge "no first use" of nuclear weapons. strategy--Chinese strategy was designed to defeat a Soviet invasion He is vice president of the Shanghai Institute for International Strategic Studies (SIISS), vice chairman of the Shanghai Association of International Studies, and vice president of the Shanghai Center for RimPac Strategic and International Studies (CPSIS). shorter-range) nuclear forces, and an offensively configured, war-fighting posture for its . Hui Zhang added that China’s modernization also extends to its sea-based deterrent: “China will speed up the modernization of its sea-based strategic force to secure a second-strike force in the coming years.”54 China has been developing a third generation of strategic nuclear submarines, which is called the Type-096 Tang-class. Some U.S. experts argued that the omission indicated that Beijing had shifted away from the no-first-use policy as part of its large-scale nuclear arms buildup.36 However, in another white paper, “China’s Military Strategy,” unveiled two years later, the Chinese government made it very clear that “China has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and adhered to a self-defensive nuclear strategy that is defensive in nature.”37 The white paper went further, stating that, the nuclear force is a strategic cornerstone for safeguarding national sovereignty and security. The Second Artillery conducts war planning and training under the assumption that China will absorb a first nuclear blow and use its nuclear forces only to retaliate. He added: "We cannot approach nuclear deterrence the . A decade ago, many scholars and policy analysts who followed China dismissed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as an antiquated force that was essentially infantry, fighting with decades-old weapons, poor communications, and World War II era doctrine. In 1979, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party made the decision to build the so-called underground Great Wall, which enables the Second Artillery Corps to survive and retaliate after weathering a first nuclear strike from an adversary.18. 2, Winter 1997, pp. You are leaving the website for the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy and entering a website for another of Carnegie's global centers. Conventional strategy and weapons would eventually dominate in a long war of attrition. Liu says that minimal nuclear deterrence is compatible with China's strategic culture. China's nuclear forces were also technologicall… Rather than discuss specific limitations on weapon systems, these efforts have been limited to increasing transparency about force structure plans and strategy, and well as discussing nuclear doctrine and intentions. In announcing this test, the Chinese promulgated a "no-first use" policy, reiterated Mao's atom bomb-paper tiger theme, repeated China's advocacy of complete prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons, condemned the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 as a "big fraud to fool the people of the world," and stated that "China's aim is to break the nuclear . China's nuclear arsenal, even if intended only to improve . . This updated version of people's war For a long time, Chinese and U.S. nuclear experts have had problems communicating in their exchanges about nuclear doctrines, so some Chinese scholars and experts now try to explain China’s nuclear doctrine in terms of U.S. deterrence. The monograph also discusses the relationships between conventional and nuclear ballistic units in war fighting doctrine. These are critical matters for the Army and our nation. ANALYSIS: In Afghan withdrawal, a Biden doctrine surfaces New York Times. Since its first nuclear test, China declared a no first use (NFU) nuclear doctrine, meaning that in the event of a conflict or crisis, it will not resort to the first use of nuclear weapons. Given that nuclear arsenals are increasingly viewed as a critical assurance of military supremacy and security, this book distils the evolving trends in China's nuclear doctrine and strategy, and chronicles the journey of a nuclear China, ... China does not seek superiority through numbers in its nuclear force and does not want to engage in nuclear competition with other countries. [39] Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, "Libyan Arms Designs Traced back to China: Pakistanis Resold Chinese-Provided Plans," The Washington Post, 15 February 2004, p. A01, www.washingtonpost.com. According to A Guide to the Study of Campaign Theory, People’s Liberation Army doctrine requires that the Second Artillery Corps “operate and coordinate with air, ground and other defensive organizations under the direction of the CMC to implement a nuclear counterattack campaign.”21 The Second Artillery Corps has a system of three classes of readiness to which its units must adhere.22 Under normal conditions, the missile units are at third-class warning status. China’s nuclear strategy is subject to the state’s nuclear policy and military strategy. Though a mass ground assault on the mainland seems highly implausible, this construct still accounts for more military resources than the others. [40] Alistair Ian Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence versus Multilateral Arms Control," China Quarterly, June 1996, pp. Given that nuclear arsenals are increasingly viewed as a critical assurance of military supremacy and security, this book distils the evolving trends in China’s nuclear doctrine and strategy, and chronicles the journey of a nuclear China, ... Also, some in China are questioning whether the doctrine of "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons serves China . The geopolitical aspirations of the People's Republic of China place this state at odds with American interests in the Pacific. NFU for China does not withstand the test of common sense. China repeatedly has vowed never to use nuclear weapons first, but On the other hand, China has made readjustments in its nuclear doctrine according to the changes of its internal and external situation and its general strategic threat perception. 49 Xu Nengwu and Huang Changyun, “Space Deterrence: U.S. Strategic Deterrence System Readjustment and Global Strategic Stability,” Foreign Affairs Review,no. No first use of nuclear weapons has strategic significance and is based on deep consideration. But whatever the sources of China's nuclear doctrine, misperceptions about it continue to endure. China's nuclear forces were also technologically outmoded and fixed to silo or tunnel . In March of 1992, China formally undertook to abide by the guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the multinational effort to restrict the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. while adapting military strategy and tactics to the needs of modern 40 Xia Liping, “On China’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Journal of China and International Relations 3, no. Basic Documents. such as exchanging deployment plans and information about nuclear doctrine. China's nuclear build-up: The great distraction By Rose Gottemoeller, Opinion ContributorSeptember 13, 2021 - 02:30 PM EDT The views expressed by contributors are their own and not the view of The Hill President Biden is reviewing America's nuclear posture. Shifting Chinese Nuclear Doctrine? [34] "ä¸å½æ¿åºååå³å®åå ä¸æ©æ£æ ¸æ¦å¨æ¡çº¦ [The Chinese Government Decides in Principle to Join the NPT]," Renmin Ribao, 11 August 1991, via: www.xinhuanet.com. India's nuclear doctrine is considered to be based upon rationality and logic as well as it promotes stability over threats. . From the early 1950s until the mid-1970s, people's war remained Unless such conditions are favorable, states are unlikely to take initiatives to either reduce or eliminate their nuclear weapons stockpiles. This book examines the geopolitical necessities which will encourage nuclear disarmament globally. capability in the early 1980s, provided Beijing with a credible, if 2. Found insideThis book examines India’s nuclear strategy as it confronts the potential threat from both China and Pakistan. Examining the reasoning and deterrence consequences of regional power nuclear strategies, this book demonstrates that these strategies matter greatly to international stability and it provides new insights into conflict dynamics across ... China's nuclear program follows a doctrine of minimal deterrence, which involves having the minimum force needed to deter an aggressor from launching a first strike. leaders to pay tribute to Mao's military and revolutionary legacy 55 Kelley Currie, “The Doctrine of ‘Strategic Reassurance,’” Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2009, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704224004574488292885761628; Michael Green, Jim Steinberg, and Michael O’Hanlon, “Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century,” Brookings Institution, May 5, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2014/05/05-us-china-relations; Yuan Peng, “‘Strategic Reassurance’ and the Future of China-U.S. Relations,” China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, October 2010, 1; David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Era of Vulnerability (Washington, DC: National Defense University, January 2013), 3. strategists also evinced an interest in tactical nuclear weapons, China also has decided not to engage in new nuclear cooperation with Iran (even under safeguards), and will complete existing cooperation, which is not of proliferation concern, within a relatively short period. In their statement, the Chinese said that they had consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and had declared on many occasions that under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. It was initially based on self-defence during the era of "people's war". Beijing has long held a no-first-use stance, but the Pentagon cites ambiguity with the conditions under which this policy would not hold. before it could penetrate deeply into China. The Soviet refusal to back the Chinese in any risky situation was evident in the Quemoy crisis of August-September 1958. In this scenario, China would defend its own territory against a land invasion by exploiting its advantages in manpower and geography. China's Strategic Arsenal is essential reading for an up-to-date and comprehensive volume that provides judicious insights about China's nuclear doctrine, strategy, and capabilities, including opportunities for arms control." ― Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies, Georgetown University, and former National Security Council Senior Director for . No conservative military planner would adopt NFU when, as Ms. Cunningham correctly observes, China lacks BMEWS and satellite early warning systems that would enable China . If a country targets China’s nuclear forces or their command and control systems with a conventional weapon, should China regard it to be tantamount to a first nuclear strike that deserves a nuclear response? With Xi, it appears that is changing , and a larger nuclear force could increase China's confidence when dealing with foreign policy challenges like the South China . © 2021 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. So any indication of change in the doctrine is a cause for concern. China's recent reforms have led to unprecedented economic growth; if this continues, China will be able to turn its great potential power into actual power. account the adaptations in strategy and tactics necessitated by No . China's nuclear detonation at Lop Nor has dramatised the last decade of advancement in Chinese Communist strategic thinking and weapons production: use of Uranium-235 suggests the availability of a uranium hexafluoride gaseous diffusion plant, aside from the plutonium-producing reactors already identified, and suggests the imminence of a Communist Chinese H-Bomb. Her promise to pursue Taiwan’s independence from China will inevitably strain relations between the United States and China, and may lead to Chinese-U.S. armed conflict. 21 Xue Xinglin, Zhanyi Lilun Xuexi Zhinan [A guide to the study of campaign theory](Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2002), 387–8. The study of Kristensen concludes that China's current nuclear warheads are about 280 increased from 240 in 2012. Washington, DC 20036-2103. 45 Defense Science Board Task Force, Future Strategic Strike Forces (Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Department of Defense, February 2004), 5–12; Zachary Keck, “US Navy Explores Sub-Launched Hypersonic Missiles,” Diplomat, February 4, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/us-navy-explores-sub-launched-hypersonic-missiles/. Check your email for details on your request. Found insideBased on primary-source research and interviews, this book will be important reading for scholars and students of nuclear deterrence and India's international relations, as well as for military, defense contractor, and policy audiences both ... technological advances in weaponry. It gradually shifted to one of minimum nuclear deterrence during the 1960s and 1970s and now appears to have stabilised at limited nuclear deterrence, which includes . China has maintained a doctrine of minimum deterrence since its first nuclear test in 1964. 40-48. Some Chinese nuclear policies and views cannot be explained by the U.S. security paradigm.53. China has adopted a new nuclear doctrine during the past 5-10 years of limited nuclear deterrence. Nuclear doctrine and policy. In January 1996 meetings with top Chinese military officials, Chas.
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